forces or those of our allies, under single or joint control. As a major illustration important both for defense and foreign policy, I shall treat the particularly stringent conditions for deterrence which affect forces based close to the enemy, whether they are U.S. Deterrence in the 1960's will be neither inevitable nor impossible but the product of sustained intelligent effort, attainable only by continuing hard choice. The balance, I believe, is in fact precarious, and this fact has critical implications for policy. Because of its crucial role in the Western strategy of defense, I should like to examine the stability of the thermonuclear balance which, it is generally supposed, would make aggression irrational or even insane. One of the most important of these assumptions - that a general thermonuclear war is extremely unlikely - is held in common by most of the critics of our defense policy as well as by its proponents.

Western defense policy has almost returned to the level of activity and the emphasis suited to the basic assumptions which were controlling before Sputnik. The flurry of statements and investigations and improvised responses has died down, leaving a small residue: a slight increase in the schedule of bomber and ballistic missile production, with a resulting small increment in our defense expenditures for the current fiscal year, a considerable enthusiasm for space travel, and some stirrings of interest in the teaching of mathematics and physics in the secondary schools. The first shock administered by the Soviet launching of Sputnik has almost dissipated.

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